Stipulation Summaries

SUPREME COURT, STATE OF COLORADO ORIGINAL PROCEEDING IN DISCIPLINE BEFORE THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDING DISCIPLINARY JUDGE 1300 BROADWAY, SUITE 250 DENVER, CO 80203 __________________________________________________________________________ Complainant: THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF COLORADO

_____________________ Case Number: 24PDJ081

Respondent: CHUCK ODIFU EGBUNE, #26022

AMENDED OPINION IMPOSING SANCTIONS UNDER C.R.C.P. 242.31(b)

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SUMMARY

Following a sanctions hearing, the Presiding Disciplinary Judge disbarred Chuck Odifu Egbune, attorney registration number 26022 (“Respondent”). The disbarment is scheduled to take effect on July 16, 2025.

Respondent was suspended from the practice of law in June 2023. Even though he knew he could not engage in the practice of law thereafter, he continued to represent his sister by filing briefs and appellate pleadings on her behalf. By assisting his sister, Respondent engaged in the unauthorized practice of law in violation of Colo. RPC 5.5(a), which prohibits a lawyer from practicing law in Colorado without a valid license to practice law unless otherwise specifically authorized.

I.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The People filed a complaint in this case on October 18, 2024. Under C.R.C.P. 242.26, Respondent’s answer was due by November 15, 2024. But Respondent did not submit any filing before that date.

Only on Sunday, December 8, 2024, did Respondent attempt to file a motion seeking additional time to submit his answer. He backdated his motion to December 5, 2024. In that motion, Respondent represented that he planned to be out of the country on a religious retreat beginning December 5, 2024, and he asked the Court to extend his deadline to answer until February 17, 2025. Citing filing deficiencies, the Court’s administrator rejected Respondent’s

1 The Court AMENDS the previously issued opinion under C.R.C.P. 60(a) to correct a clerical mistake on the disbarment effective date.

motion on Monday, December 9, 2024, and invited Respondent to resubmit his motion with those deficiencies corrected.

The People moved for entry of default on December 9, 2024, as required under C.R.C.P. 242.27. The same day, the Court issued an order directing Respondent to answer the People’s complaint and to respond to their motion for default no later than December 30, 2024. The Court sent that order to Respondent’s registered mailing and email addresses. 2

On December 30, 2024, Respondent filed “Respondent’s Motion for an Extension of Time to File a Response to the People’s Motion for Default under C.R.C.P. 242.27.” In that filing, Respondent represented that he was out of the country on a religious retreat, which required him to avoid litigation during the retreat. But he provided no further evidence, including information about his religious practice, to support his proffer. More importantly, however, Respondent did not provide any information to justify why he failed to timely answer before its due date, November 15, 2024. On January 24, 2025, the Court issued an order on his motion. In that order, the Court expressed its preference to resolve this matter on the merits, with the benefit of Respondent’s participation, and thus granted Respondent a limited extension to January 31, 2025, to file his answer and his response to the People’s motion for default. But Respondent failed to submit a filing by January 31, 2025.

A week after Respondent’s deadline to answer had lapsed—on February 7, 2025—the Court granted the People’s motion for default and entered default. In that order, the Court directed the People to file an affidavit consistent with C.R.C.P. 121 section 1-14. The Court then set this matter for a sanctions hearing to take place on April 24, 2025.

On February 21, 2025, Respondent filed “Respondent’s Motion for an Extension of Time to File Any Post Judgment Motion.” In that motion, Respondent asserted that he did not comply with the Court’s January 2025 order because his email provider routed the order to a spam folder. On March 5, 2025, the Court denied that motion, explaining that a posttrial motion under C.R.C.P. 60(b) was premature because the Court had entered default but had not yet entered judgment. Wishing to expedite litigation involving a motion to set aside entry of default, the Court set a deadline to file any such motion for Monday, March 10, 2025.

That day, Respondent timely filed a three-page motion to set aside default. After considering Respondent’s motion and the People’s response, the Court denied his motion on April 9, 2025. The Court concluded that setting aside the default would be improper under C.R.C.P. 55(c), as Respondent failed to show that the neglect causing the default was excusable; he never alleged any defense, let alone a meritorious one; and he did not demonstrate that relieving him of the entry of default would be equitable.

2 On December 30, 2024, the United States Postal Service sent back the order as returned mail from Respondent’s registered address.

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On April 10, 2025, Respondent filed a nine-page motion to reconsider the order issued the previous day. The Court denied that motion on April 15, 2025, concluding that Respondent failed to meet the standards justifying reconsideration of his motion to set aside default and cautioning Respondent that it would hear no further argument in support of his request to set aside entry of default.

The Court convened the scheduled sanctions hearing on April 24, 2025. Kristofco attended on behalf of the People, and Respondent appeared pro se. At the hearing, the Court first entertained argument on “Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Anti-Slapp Statute and P.O.M.E.,” which he filed on April 17, 2025. The Court reserved ruling on that motion but determined that because the motion did not encompass all of the People’s allegations, the sanctions hearing could go forward. The Court thus heard testimony from Victor Morales, Matthew Chudacoff, and Respondent. No exhibits were admitted into evidence.

II.

ORDER DENYING RESPONDENT’S MOTION TO DISMISS

The week before trial, Respondent filed his motion to dismiss. Given the proximity of the hearing date, the Court did not require the People to respond in writing. Instead, it advised the parties that it would hear oral argument on the motion at the scheduled sanctions hearing.

At the hearing, Respondent argued that his underlying conduct in advancing litigation was protected by the First Amendment under Protect Our Mountain Environment, Inc. v. District Court (“POME”). 3 Per POME, he said, the People were required to show that the underlying litigation— in which he claimed that he represented himself and not his sister, Felicia Aniniba—was both objectively baseless and was based on subjectively improper motivation. 4 He also pointed to Ferraro v. Frias Drywall, LLC, 5 to argue that the Court has discretion to sua sponte examine the sufficiency of the People’s complaint and set aside default on the grounds that he was not engaged in the underlying litigation in a representative capacity.

The People opposed dismissal, asserting that Respondent’s motion was untimely. The People also disputed the factual basis of Respondent’s motion: they do not seek to discipline Respondent for litigating his own case, they said. Rather, they claimed, they brought a complaint against Respondent based exclusively on his conduct in litigating on his sister’s behalf.

The Court cannot grant Respondent’s motion to dismiss. First, Respondent’s motion under POME is not jurisdictional. Instead, his motion merely asserts a defense, which he forfeited when he failed to answer the People’s complaint. The Court thus agrees with the People that Respondent’s motion is untimely. But even if the Court considered the merits of Respondent’s

3 677 P.2d 1361 (Colo. 1984). 4 See In re Foster, 253 P.3d 1244, 1254-55 (Colo. 2011) (applying POME to prohibit professional sanctions on a lawyer who engaged in pro se litigation absent such a heightened showing). 5 2019 COA 123.

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motion, the People’s unanswered complaint plainly shows that their allegations are premised on Respondent acting in a representative capacity by writing his sister’s appeal brief, 6 by filing her appeal brief, 7 and by drafting or assisting her to draft appellate pleadings. 8 The Court thus finds that the People’s allegations do not support Respondent’s argument that he was engaged in pro se litigation. As such, the People need not make a heightened showing under POME. The Court DENIES Respondent’s motion to dismiss.

III.

ESTABLISHED FACTS AND RULE VIOLATIONS

The Court adopts and incorporates by reference the facts of this case as fully detailed in the complaint. Respondent was admitted to the practice of law in Colorado on October 23, 1995, under attorney registration number 26022. He is thus subject to the jurisdiction of the Colorado Supreme Court and the Court in this disciplinary proceeding.

Always Enterprises, d/b/a A-1 Bail Bonds, loaned Respondent $35,000.00 through a promissory note secured by a deed of trust on Respondent’s personal home. On November 19, 2015, A-1 Bail Bonds, by and through its lawyer Larry Henning, filed a foreclosure action against Respondent.

On January 23, 2017, A-1 Bail Bonds filed a “Verified Motion for Order Authorizing Sale,” which was granted March 14, 2018, nunc pro tunc to May 19, 2017. The property was purchased by Breckenridge Property Fund 2016, LLC (“Breckenridge”).

On November 9, 2017, Respondent filed a complaint in Douglas County, Colorado, case number 2017CV31060, against A-1 Bail Bonds and Henning, alleging fraud, negligence, and other claims.

At some point, Respondent executed a $450,000.00 deed of trust on his home for the benefit of his sister, Felicia Aniniba. Although the deed of trust was dated 2016, it was not recorded with the Douglas County Clerk and Recorder until 2021. Ultimately, the Douglas County District Court determined the $450,000.00 deed of trust was fraudulent.

At various times during the foreclosure action (consolidated with case number 2017CV31060 in Douglas County District Court), Respondent stated via filed court pleadings and statements to the court that he was representing his sister, Aniniba, as well as representing himself.

Respondent was suspended from the practice of law for three years beginning June 9, 2023. On June 23, 2023, the court in case 2017CV31060 issued findings of fact, conclusions of law, and judgment against Respondent and Aniniba.

6 Compl. ¶ 17. 7 Compl. ¶ 18. 8 Compl. ¶ 19.

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On July 17, 2023, Respondent filed a “Motion to Vacate Judgment pursuant to Rule 59 on the claims of Breckenridge and Judgment Creditors.” Respondent knew at the time he filed that motion that he had been suspended from practicing law in Colorado. In his “Motion to Vacate Judgment pursuant to Rule 59 on the claims of Breckenridge and Judgment Creditors,” signed and filed after the date of his suspension, Respondent asserted the following legal arguments on behalf of Aniniba:

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On page six, the motion stated, “Mr. Egbune will now turn next to the question of the propriety of the money judgments imposed by this court against the fraudulent transferee, Ms. Aniniba. It is the general rule that as long as the subject property remains in the possession of the fraudulent transferee in toto and is not depreciated by any action of the fraudulent transferee, a personal judgment against such transferee will not be sustained. Thus, this court’s money judgment against Ms. Aniniba without showing that she depreciated the property is again not authorized by law. Miller v. Kaiser, 164 Colo. 206, 433 P.2d 772 (1967); See also Emarine v. Haley, 892 P.2d 343, 348- 49 (Colo.App.1994) (The primary remedy in an action for fraudulent conveyance is to return the property fraudulently conveyed to its prior status of ownership, thereby bringing it within reach of the judgment creditor of the fraudulent transferor).”

On page eight, the motion stated, “This court should take judicial notice that Ms. Aniniba voluntarily filed a motion agreeing to her deed being subordinated on this matter very early on the proceeding. This is akin to a reconveyance. Mr. Egbune has not found a case where a transferee agreed to have her interest subordinated under CUFTA as was done by Ms. Aniniba. However, the Connecticut Supreme Court has considered whether reconveyance or a transferred asset may release the transferee from liability under Connecticut's CUFTA. which is substantially similar to CUFTA. See Robinson v Coughlin. 266 Conn. 1, 830 A.2d 1114 (2003).”

On page nine, the motion stated, “Because Ms. Aniniba voluntarily moved to have her interests subordinated before judgment entered on this case, equity requires that Breckenridge be barred from any CUFTA claim here. Ms. Aniniba was not under any legal obligation to agree to subordination. she morally chose to do so. Therefore, equity should preclude Breckenridge from any CUFTA claims.” 9

While Respondent was suspended from the practice of law, he assisted his sister, Aniniba, to write her appeal brief for the Colorado Court of Appeals. On March 26, 2024, Aniniba filed her appeal brief in Colorado Court of Appeals cases 2023CA1721 and 2023CA1722, which Respondent assisted her to write. Respondent drafted or assisted with drafting the appellate pleadings filed in his sister’s name, but he failed to note his assistance in any of them.

Aniniba’s appeal brief stated, “Unfortunately, Mr. Egbune's license to practice law was suspended mid trial so he stopped representing me from that time. However, he saw the

9 Compl. ¶¶ 16(a)-(c).

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suspension coming and drafted the appeal before he was suspended and gave to me in anticipation knowing that the Judge was biased against him.” 10

Respondent must have assisted Aniniba with her appeal brief after he was suspended because he was suspended before the final order being appealed was entered; as a result, he could not have known before the effective date of his suspension what evidence would be admitted at the trial, what rulings the court would make throughout the entire trial, or the final judgment the court would enter—all of which appears in Aniniba’s brief. Further, the appellate filings are consistent with Respondent’s writing style and level of legal knowledge, whereas his sister has no legal training and acknowledged during the underlying litigation that she had little or no understanding of the nature of the proceedings.

Through this conduct, Respondent violated Colo. RPC 5.5(a), which prohibits a lawyer from practicing law in Colorado without a valid license to practice law issued by the Colorado Supreme Court unless specifically authorized by C.R.C.P. 204 or C.R.C.P. 205 or federal or tribal law. Although Respondent’s license to practice law in Colorado was suspended as of June 9, 2023, and although Respondent knew he could not engage in the practice of law, he continued to represent his sister in legal proceedings. He engaged in the unauthorized practice of law when he filed a brief on July 17, 2023, in Douglas County District Court, asserting numerous legal arguments on behalf of Aniniba. In addition, Respondent knew he could not practice law when he assisted Aniniba with her appeal brief in Colorado Court of Appeals cases 2023CA1721 and 2023CA1722. By assisting her, Respondent engaged in the unauthorized practice of law in violation of Colo. RPC 5.5(a).

IV.

SANCTIONS

The American Bar Association Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions (“ABA Standards”) 11 and Colorado Supreme Court case law guide the imposition of sanctions for lawyer misconduct. 12 When imposing a sanction after a finding of lawyer misconduct, the Court must consider the duty the lawyer violated, the lawyer’s mental state, and the actual or potential injury the lawyer’s misconduct caused. These three variables yield a presumptive sanction that the Court may then adjust based on aggravating and mitigating factors.

ABA Standard 3.0 – Duty, Mental State, and Injury

Duty: Respondent violated the duties he owed as a professional by disregarding his order of suspension and practicing law without authorization.

10 Compl. ¶ 20. 11 Found in ABA Annotated Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions (2d ed. 2019). 12 See In re Roose, 69 P.3d 43, 46-47 (Colo. 2003).

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Mental State: Respondent acted knowingly when he engaged in the unauthorized practice of law on his sister’s behalf.

Injury: Victor Morales and Matthew Chudacoff testified at the hearing as to the harm resulting from Respondent’s actions, including the time and money their clients spent addressing the arguments Respondent made impermissibly.

Morales represented Henning, who in turn represented A-1 Bail Bonds. Having litigated against Respondent for around a decade, Morales became quite familiar with Respondent’s writing style and litigation approach. According to Morales, Respondent’s and Aniniba’s briefs mirrored one another: just like Respondent’s briefs, Aniniba’s filings were disorganized and difficult to understand. Morales had no doubt that Respondent wrote Aniniba’s filings for her. In Morales’s view, Respondent’s unauthorized law practice unnecessarily expanded litigation, harming Morales’s client by forcing him to incur an “endless parade of attorney’s fees” to defend claims that he considered to be groundless. Morales estimated that attorney’s fees related to Respondent’s unauthorized law practice came to between $25,000.00 and $30,000.00.

Chudacoff, who represented Breckenridge in the litigation, also testified about the harm occasioned by Respondent’s unauthorized practice of law. Chudacoff testified that Aniniba’s post-trial litigation and appeal—orchestrated by Respondent—unnecessarily cost his client additional money to fund a defense. Chudacoff estimated that his client spent approximately $23,000.00 in legal fees attributable to Respondent’s unauthorized representation of Aniniba.

Finally, the Court finds that Respondent’s decision to disobey his order suspending him from the practice of law undermined the authority and dignity of the legal system and corroded the reputation of lawyers.

ABA Standards 4.0-8.0 – Presumptive Sanction

The People contend the presumptive sanction in this case should be set with reference to ABA Standard 7.1, which generally provides for disbarment when a lawyer knowingly engages in conduct that violates a professional duty with the intent to obtain a benefit for the lawyer or another, thereby causing serious or potentially serious injury to a client, the public, or the legal system. The People also point to ABA Standard 8.1(a), which calls for disbarment when a lawyer intentionally or knowingly violates the terms of a prior disciplinary order and causes injury or potential injury to a client, the public, the legal system, or the profession.

Respondent does not rely on any ABA Standard and instead argues that no discipline is warranted because he did not knowingly violate the law. He also contends that the Court failed to give him a fair opportunity to defend himself.

The Court finds that ABA Standard 8.1(a) best fits the facts here. Respondent, a suspended lawyer, knowingly engaged in conduct that amounted to the unauthorized practice of law, thereby

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violating his suspension order. By ghostwriting appellate filings for his sister, he flouted disciplinary orders, injuring the legal system and the profession, and needlessly expanded the litigation, taxing parties’ and the court’s resources. The Court thus begins its analysis with disbarment as the baseline sanction.

ABA Standard 9.0 – Aggravating and Mitigating Factors

With disbarment as the presumptive sanction, the Court next assesses aggravating factors, which are any considerations that may justify an increase in the degree of the sanction to be imposed, as well as mitigating factors, which are circumstances that may warrant a reduction in sanction’s severity. 13 As outlined below, the Court applies three factors in aggravation and no factors in mitigation.

Aggravating Factors Under ABA Standard 9.22

Prior Disciplinary Offenses – 9.22(a): Respondent has thrice been disciplined. In case number 04PDJ039, Respondent was suspended for six months, with all but thirty days stayed pending his successful completion of a two-year period of probation. In case number 15PDJ025, Respondent stipulated to a public censure. Finally, in case number 22PDJ029, a hearing board suspended Respondent for three years. 14 The Court thus applies this factor in aggravation.

Dishonest or Selfish Motive – 9.22(b): The People ask the Court to apply this factor, arguing that Respondent acted selfishly by asserting legal arguments on his sister’s behalf so that he could continue to live in his home while the litigation was pending. Although Respondent likely would have derived some benefit if he or his sister prevailed in—or even stretched out—the litigation, the record lacks sufficient evidence to conclude that Respondent was motivated by dishonesty or selfishness. The Court declines to apply this factor.

Refusal to Acknowledge Wrongful Nature of Misconduct – 9.22(g): At the sanctions hearing, Respondent did not express any regret or remorse for his misconduct. To the contrary, he dug his heels in and justified his actions by insisting, first, that he only represented himself, and second, that he drafted his sister’s appellate brief before he was suspended (and thus before trial was finished). This defense, which is as incredible as it is audacious, inclines the Court to conclude that Respondent refuses to acknowledge that his misconduct was wrongful. Most telling, however, is Respondent’s answer to the Court’s inquiry about mitigating factors, including whether he should be given credit for remorse; Respondent answered, “I don’t have any remorse because I didn’t do anything wrong.” The Court applies this aggravating factor.

13 See ABA Standards 9.21 and 9.31. 14 The Colorado Supreme Court affirmed the hearing board’s opinion on February 22, 2024, in case number 23SA101.

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Substantial Experience in the Practice of Law – 9.22(i): Respondent was first licensed in 1995. Respondent’s suspension took effect on the same day that the trial at issue commenced: June 9, 2023. Because at that point Respondent had over twenty-seven years of experience as a lawyer, this aggravating factor applies.

Mitigating Factors Under ABA Standard 9.32

Absence of a Dishonest or Selfish Motive – 9.32(b): Respondent asks the Court to apply this factor, arguing on the one hand that he was not paid for his work, while at the same time contending that Aniniba did her own appellate work. As mentioned above, however, Respondent likely stood to benefit in some degree if he or Aniniba succeeded on appeal or even managed to prolong the appellate process. The Court thus declines to apply this factor.

Full and Free Disclosure to Disciplinary Authorities or Cooperative Attitude Toward Proceedings – 9.32(e): Respondent contends this factor applies because, he says, he responded to all of the People’s inquiries. The Court declines to apply this factor, however, after taking notice of its own record in this case: Respondent failed to file a timely answer, failed to abide by the Court’s orders, and repeatedly attempted to relitigate the Court’s entry of default and its refusal to set aside that default. 15 These tactical decisions unnecessarily complicated the litigation in this case and invalidated any claim to cooperation.

Character or Reputation – 9.32(g): Respondent urges the Court to apply this factor. In support, Respondent testified without corroboration that he has helped many clients who have been satisfied with his work; that he has received several good reviews on Google; and that he has done noble work in the immigration field, where he says he assisted clients facing removal, succeeded in inherently difficult asylum cases, and helped people attain lawful permanent resident status in the United States. While the Court does not disbelieve Respondent’s account, it does not weigh his testimony in a vacuum, either. Given Respondent’s three prior public discipline cases spanning a twenty-year period, the Court cannot find that Respondent’s unsupported testimony about his character or reputation should carry any mitigating weight.